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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the information content and the usefulness of banks' interest rate risk public 
disclosures.  ALM managers use Earnings at Risk ( EAR ) and Economic Value of Equity at Risk ( 
EVEAR ) as measures of the dollar amount of potential loss to net interest income and common 
shareholders' equity as a result of unforeseen interest rate changes. These two interest rate risk 
management metrics are now recognized benchmarks for measuring interest rate risk exposure, and 
its potential impact on a bank's financial position. At the explicit request of regulators, financial 
analysts and competitive pressures, more commercial banks are now reporting EAR and EVEAR 
numbers in their annual financial reports. To examine preliminary evidence on the information 
content of such public disclosures,  we composed a sample of some of North America's largest 
commercial banks. The Canadian peer group is based on Canada's seven largest banks, and the 
U.S. peer group is composed of twelve of its largest banks. In particular, we investigate if "ex ante" 
EAR and EVEAR numbers help regulators, financial analysts and investors to explain the 
subsequent variability of commercial banks' net interest income and net income over time. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
LM managers use Earnings at Risk (EAR) and Economic Value of Equity at Risk (EVEAR) as 
measures of the dollar amount of potential loss to net interest income and common shareholder's 
equity as a result of unforeseen interest rate changes.  These two interest rate risk managerment 
metrics are now recognized benchmarks for measuring the non-trading exposure to interest rate risk, and its potential 
impact on a bank's financial position. Similarly, the Value at Risk (VAR) measure is the recognized benchmark for 
measuring the trading exposure to all market risks, including interest rate risk, and its potential impact on a bank's 
financial position. 
 
At the explicit request of regulators, financial analysts and competitive pressures, more internationally active 
commercial banks are now reporting EAR and EVEAR numbers in their annual financial reports.  Lopez (2003) 
explains the ongoing international efforts to improve the regulation and supervision of banking institutions to reflect 
advances in financial risk management techniques.  His analysis supports the view that improved public disclosures 
regarding their conditions, operations and risk management information lead to increased transparency and should 
lead to more effective market discipline. 
 
The evolution of bank disclosure standards in the United States has been described in a study published by 
the BGFRS (2000).  The SEC and the FASB together set the core disclosure requirements for publicly traded banks.  
Moreover, all banks in the U.S. are required to file quarterly regulatory reports. 
 
In a recent publication, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2003) provides an overview of 
the disclosure practices of a sample of internationally active commercial banks.  The BCBS survey focuses on the 
annual reports of 54 banks headquartered in the committee's member counties.  It included 104 questions addressing 
quantitative and qualitative disclosures in 4 various categories: capital adequacy, market risk internal modeling, 
A 
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derivatives, accounting and presentation policies  The survey reveals that many banks have continued to expand the 
extent of their disclosures.  The main findings of the disclosure survey that relate more directly to the focus of this 
study are the following: Firstly, disclosure of information on internal risk models was much more common for market 
risk than for credit risk.  Secondly, the most noteworthy improvement is the increase in the disclosure of information 
on other risks (operational and legal risks, liquidity risk and interest rate risk in the banking book (non-traded).  
Thirdly, regarding individual disclosure items, the survey results indicate that market risk internal modeling (e.g. the 
type used) was one of the most common items disclosed. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section two defines the EAR and EVEAR non-trading exposure 
measures; the VAR trading exposure measure is also examined as well as its predictive power.  The third section 
describes the research methods, the bank sample data, and formulates hypotheses on the usefulness of EAR and 
EVEAR numbers to explain the subsequent variability of commercial banks' earnings and economic value of equity.  
Section four presents and discusses the study's empirical results.  Finally, the conclusion, limits of the study and 
suggestions for further research are drawn in the fifth section. 
 
IMPROVED MARKET RISK INFORMATION DISCLOSURES 
 
Recently, several authors have examined if improved market risk information disclosures lead to increased 
transparency and more effective market discipline.  Wong (2000) studied the association between SFAS no. 119 
derivatives disclosures and the foreign exchange risk exposure of manufacturing firms.  Christofferson, Hahn and 
Inoue (2001) tested, compared and combined value at risk measures.  Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001) evaluated the 
accuracy of VAR at commercial banks.  In another study, Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalan and Welken (2002) 
analyzed the effect of mandated market risk disclosure on trading volume sensitivity to interest rate, exchange rate and 
commodity price movements. 
 
Of more direct importance to the focus of this study, Lopez (2003) summarizes the conclusion of a case study 
reported by the BGFR (2000) regarding SEC requirements for disclosure of market risk exposures.  The author 
defines market risk exposures as potential financial losses due to adverse movement in securities market prices.  Most 
often, commercial banks report such risks with value-at-risk (VAR) estimates that summarize the potential losses that 
might occur with a specified probability (95 % or 99 % of the time) over a given time horizon like one or 10 trading 
days. A bank disclosing, for example, that its daily VAR is $25 million at the 99 %level, indicates that there is only a 
1 % chance the bank will incur more than a $25 million trading loss over the next day.  "In the case study, bank VAR 
disclosures were found to vary in detail across banks and to have an unclear connection with actual trading 
performance during the turbulent third quarter of 1998".  The author finds that even though such heterogeneity is 
present in these types of public disclosures, the academic literature still suggests that market participants can assess 
bank risks accurately. 
 
In another more recent study of VAR disclosures, Jorion (2003) found that VAR numbers in quarterly and 
annual reports, from 1995 to 2000, of 8 publicly traded U.S. commercial banks provided reasonable predictions of the 
subsequent variability of their trading revenues.  Thus, the empirical results presented in the Jorion study suggest that 
VAR disclosures are informative in that they predict the variability of trading revenues.  Thus, analysts and investors 
can use VAR disclosures to compare the risk profiles of banks' trading portfolios. 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of Sun Trust Banks' EAR and EVEAR disclosures.  Notice that this bank uses 
Net Interest Income-at-Risk instead of the more common EAR measure; nevertheless, both measures are compatible.  
In addition, management's discussion provides valuable disclosures into the interest risk modeling process at Sun 
Trust Banks. 
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FIGURE 1:  Excerpts from the Annual Report of Sun Trust Banks, 2002, pp. 37-38, Management's Discussion of 
Market Risk from Non-Trading Activities. 
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TESTING THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS-AT-RISK AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF 
EQUITY-AT-RISK PUBLIC DISCLOSURES 
 
EAR 
 
The EARNINGS-AT-RISK measure represents an ex ante estimate of changes in earnings over the next 
twelve months should interest rate change by + or – 100 basis points.  This formulation of short-term interest 
sensitivity analysis is performed and disclosed by most financial institutions and facilitates comparisons between 
peers. 
 
EVEAR 
 
The ECONOMIC VALUE OF EQUITY-AT-RISK measure represents an ex ante estimate of net change 
between the present value of assets and the present value of liabilities should interest rate change by +/- 100 basis 
points.  This formulation of longer-term interest sensitivity analysis is also performed and disclosed by many financial 
institutions and further facilitates comparisons between peers. 
 
Proposed Testing Procedure 
 
We postulate that those institutions with the lowest (highest) ex ante relative EAR measures should display 
the lowest (highest) ex post relative changes in their earnings as a result of a given change in interest rate levels.  To 
do so, the following equation is estimated : 
 
t + 1 t
t t
Δ E EAR
 = a + b 
E E
 (1) 
 
Where  Et+1 measures the dollar change in net interest income from period t to period t+1, Et measures the period t 
net interest income in dollars, EARt represents the short-term interest rate risk dollar disclosure at period t.  
Expressing both the l.h.s. and r.h.s. of equation (1) in relative values allows comparisons to be carried out over time 
with the same institution, and between institutions which have different earnings.  We propose to test equation (1) 
empirically using the OLS regression method. 
 
As shown further on, our data sample consists of twenty North American commercial banks.  Here, we 
postulate that those institutions with the lowest rank (highest rank) in their ex ante relative EAR measures should also 
display the lowest rank (highest rank) in their ex post relative changes in earnings as a result of a given change in 
interest rate levels.  To do so, the following equation is estimated: 
 
t+1 t
t t
Δ E EAR
Rank (i)  = a + b Rank (i) 
E E
 (2) 
 
Where Rank (i) varies from one (lowest ex ante relative EAR measure or lowest relative change in earnings) 
to twenty (highest ex ante relative EAR measure or highest relative change in earnings).  Expressing both the l.h.s. and 
r.h.s. of equation (2) in rank values allows more general comparisons to be carried out over time between institutions.  
We propose to test equation (2) empirically using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
 
Since the procedure for testing the information content of EAR and EVEAR public disclosure measures are 
practically similar, they are not repeated here for EVEAR. 
 
Sample Description 
 
To examine preliminary evidence on the information content of banks' EAR and EVEAR public disclosures.  
I composed a sample of some of North America's largest commercial banks.  The Canadian bank peer group is based 
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on Canada's seven largest domestic banks, and the U.S. peer group is composed of thirteen of its largest commercial 
banks.  Table 1 shows for each bank in the data sample its ticker symbol, total assets expressed in U.S. dollars, senior 
long-term debt credit ratings, EAR and EVEAR annual data availability. 
 
TABLE 1:  DATA SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
Bank 
Ticker 
Symbol 
Total Assets 
U.S. ($ Billions)1 
S&P 
S.L.T.D. 
Ratings 2 
EAR 
Year 
Available 
EVEAR 
Year 
Available 
1. Bank of Montreal BMO  $ 161,5  AA- 1995 1995 
2. CIBC CM  $ 174,5  A+ 1998 1998 
3. Laurentian BoC. LB  $ 11,9  A- 2000 2000 
4. National BoC. NA  $ 47,6  A 1999 1999 
5. Royal BoC. RY  $ 243,9  AA- 1996 1996 
6. Scotiabank BNS  $ 189,2  A+ 1996 1996 
7. TD Bank TD  $ 177,5  A+ 1995 1995 
8. Bank of America Corp. BAC  $ 660,5  A+ 1999 Not disclosed 
9. Bank One Corp. ONE  $ 277,4  A 1997 +/- disclosed 
10. Citigroup C  $1 097,2  AA 1996 1998 
11. Fleet Boston F. Corp. FBF  $ 190,5  A 1994 1996 
12. JP Morgan Chase JPM  $ 758,8  AA- 1993 +/- disclosed 
13. Key Corp. KEY  $ 85,2  A 1994 +/- disclosed 
14. Mellon F. Corp. MEL  $ 36,2  A+ 1994 Not disclosed 
15. National City Corp. NCC  $ 118,3  A 1993 1993 
16. PNC F.S. Group PNC  $ 66,4  A- 1997 1997 
17. Sun Trust Banks STI  $ 117,3  AA- 2000 1999 
18. US Bancorp. USB  $ 180,0  A 1997 +/- disclosed 
19. Wachovia Corp. WB  $ 341,8  A 1993 Not disclosed 
20. Wells Fargod Cy. WFC  $ 349,3  A+ 1994 Not disclosed 
1 Canadian banks' total assets as of October 31, 2002 were translated at 0,6385 x Canadian $ into U.S. funds. 
2 Moody's long-term debt credit ratings were also available. 
 
 
               TABLE 2:  EAR  RESULTS - CANADIAN  BANKS 
 
  Variables Value F Test T Test Sig. 
 
  Regression R.Sq. 4.528 0.041 12.1 % 
  a  .0735  1.430 0.162 
  b (std.) -0.3470  -2.128 0.041 
 
 
As can be gathered from Table 1, the average size of the seven Canadian banks at $143 B is not that different 
from the thirteen U.S. at $329.1 B if we remove the three largest U.S. banks (BAC, C and JPM).  It is also possible to 
compute the average default risk of the seven Canadian banks and to compare it to the average default risk of the 
thirteen U.S. banks.  In order to carry out this analysis a bank's senior long-term debt credit rating is simply replaced 
by a number.  For example, AAA equals 1, AA+ equals 2, AA equals 3, AA- equals 4, A+ equals 5, A equals 6, and 
A- equals 7.  The Canadian bank sample has an average credit rating of 4,79; that is, a shade lower than the U.S. bank 
sample at 4,69.  Also important is the fact that all twenty North American banks in our sample make EAR disclosures 
in their annual reports.  All seven Canadian banks also make EVEAR disclosures in their annual reports.  In the U.S. 
bank sample, four banks disclose EVEAR numbers, one other bank, Citigroup, discloses an equivalent number using 
another measure, four banks make sporadic disclosures, three banks do not disclose EVEAR numbers, and finally one 
bank (Mellon F. Corp.) carries out EVEAR computations but they are not disclosed in its annual report.  Since EAR 
disclosures are more complete and frequent in our data sample than EVEAR disclosures, it stands to reason that more 
analysis can be carried with EAR disclosures in this study. 
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THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The objective of the empirical tests is to examine if commercial banks' ex ante EAR numbers are related to ex 
post variations in net interest income for the complete bank sample, the U.S. bank sub-sample, and the Canadian bank 
sub-sample during the study period. Similar tests were also carried out to examine if commercial banks' EVEAR 
numbers were related to ex post variations in net interest income for the Canadian and U.S. sub-samples, and also the 
complete commercial bank sample. 
 
OLS regression results indicate that ex ante EAR numbers were not closely related to ex post variations in net 
interest income for the complete bank sample and the U.S. bank sub-sample. As shown in Table 2 below, the results 
were only statistically significant for the Canadian bank sub-sample ( at the 96 % level ). 
 
In addition, OLS results also lead us to conclude that ex ante EVAR numbers were not closely related to ex 
post variations in net interest income for the complete bank sample, nor for the U.S. and Canadian bank sub-samples 
during the study period. 
 
Given the general tone of the results presented above on ex ante EAR and EVEAR numbers and subsequently 
observed variations in commercial banks' net interest income, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient analysis 
which was proposed earlier was not carried out. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study documents that EAR public disclosures were made in their annual financial reports by all 
commercial banks in our sample. In comparison, EVEAR  public disclosures were made by all Canadian banks, but by 
only a fraction of U.S. banks in our sample. ALM managers use EAR as a short-term  measure, and EVEAR as a 
longer-term measure of the dollar amount of potential loss to net interest income and common shareholders' equity as 
a result of unforeseen interest rate changes. These two interest rate risk management metrics are now recognized 
benchmarks for measuring the exposure to interest rate risk, and its potential impact on a bank's financial position. At 
the explicit request of regulators, financial analysts and competitive pressures, more commercial banks are now 
reporting EAR and EVEAR numbers in their annual financial reports. In addition, some banks like JPMorgan Chase 
in the U.S. have been reporting non-trading portfolio VaR  numbers for investment portfolio and A/L activities. 
 
To examine preliminary evidence on the information content of such EAR and EVEAR public disclosures, 
we composed a sample of some of North America's largest commercial banks. The Canadian bank sub-sample is 
based on Canada's seven largest domestic banks, and the U.S. sub-sample is composed of twelve of its largest 
commercial banks. In particular, we investigated if ex ante EAR and EVEAR numbers help regulators, financial 
analysts and investors to explain the subsequent variability of commercial banks' net interest income and net income 
over time. 
 
Unlike in Jorion's (2003) study of commercial banks' VaR public disclosures, the preliminary results 
presented in this paper indicated that banks' EAR and EVEAR public disclosures did not explain the subsequent 
variability of their net interest income over time. Canadian banks' EAR public disclosures were found to provide some 
indication of the subsequent variability of their net interest income during the period under study. 
 
Data availability:  The data used in this study can be obtained from public sources.   
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